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Title: Collective Action Dilemmas in Condominium Management
Authors: Chu, F.-N.
Chang, C.-O.
Sing, T.F. 
Issue Date: 2013
Citation: Chu, F.-N., Chang, C.-O., Sing, T.F. (2013). Collective Action Dilemmas in Condominium Management. Urban Studies 50 (1) : 128-147. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: Condominium residents are reluctant to join the management committees (MCs) and contribute to the management of local public goods because of free-riding problems. In studying a sample of condominiums in Taipei, it is found that some degree of outsourcing to third party managers (TPMs) is necessary when the scale of local public goods increases. However, higher management fees paid to TPMs are not directly related to higher utilities derived by the residents in the use of local public goods. When self-selectivity in the outsourcing decision is controlled, the results show that the efficiency in the provision of local public goods increases with the effort levels of the MC members. The MC members who adopt a hands-off approach by fully delegating the management responsibilities to TPMs deliver lower pay-offs in the provision of public goods. © 2012 Urban Studies Journal Limited.
Source Title: Urban Studies
ISSN: 00420980
DOI: 10.1177/0042098012452327
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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