Judicial Recentralization as Political Control: Evidence from the Judicial Leader Rotation in China

Abstract

Objective: This study analyzes how authoritarian leaders use the judicial system to solve the principal–agent problem in the government hierarchy. We argue that autocrats recentralize court personnel to enhance the central government’s monitoring power over local officials. Methods: Our empirical analysis takes advantage of a judicial personnel rotation reform in which the Chinese Communist Party recentralized court personnel by rotating provincial-level court leaders in 14 out of 31 provinces. Results: Panel data analysis shows that judicial recentralization increased adjudicated administrative lawsuits by nearly 30 percent. We also demonstrate that the enhancement in judicial responsiveness is not driven by alternative channels such as learning or the substitution between different ways of petitions. Conclusion: This study explores the dilemma faced by authoritarian leaders in balancing the need for an effective court system to address local governance issues while maintaining control, highlighting the compromise solution of recentralizing local judiciaries to partially insulate them from local interference.