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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110046
| Title: | Tariff evasion with endogenous enforcement | Authors: | Bussy, Adrien | Keywords: | Social Sciences Economics Business & Economics Tariff evasion Tax enforcement International trade Corruption TAX EVASION |
Issue Date: | 26-Aug-2021 | Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA | Citation: | Bussy, Adrien (2021-08-26). Tariff evasion with endogenous enforcement. ECONOMICS LETTERS 207. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110046 | Abstract: | I show theoretically and empirically that when the expected punishment for evading increases with the tariff rate, evasion via under-reporting may decrease when the tariff rate rises. Total evasion does not necessarily decrease, as importers use alternative ways to evade duties. | Source Title: | ECONOMICS LETTERS | URI: | https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/225797 | ISSN: | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110046 |
| Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications Elements |
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| SSRN-id3846714.pdf | Accepted version | 167.71 kB | Adobe PDF | OPEN | None | View/Download |
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