Tariff evasion with endogenous enforcement

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110046

DC Field	Value
dc.title	Tariff evasion with endogenous enforcement
dc.contributor.author	Bussy, Adrien
dc.date.accessioned	2022-05-19T07:26:22Z
dc.date.available	2022-05-19T07:26:22Z
dc.date.issued	2021-08-26
dc.identifier.citation	Bussy, Adrien (2021-08-26). Tariff evasion with endogenous enforcement. ECONOMICS LETTERS 207. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110046
dc.identifier.issn	0165-1765
dc.identifier.issn	1873-7374
dc.identifier.uri	https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/225797
dc.description.abstract	I show theoretically and empirically that when the expected punishment for evading increases with the tariff rate, evasion via under-reporting may decrease when the tariff rate rises. Total evasion does not necessarily decrease, as importers use alternative ways to evade duties.
dc.language.iso	en
dc.publisher	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
dc.source	Elements
dc.subject	Social Sciences
dc.subject	Economics
dc.subject	Business & Economics
dc.subject	Tariff evasion
dc.subject	Tax enforcement
dc.subject	International trade
dc.subject	Corruption
dc.subject	TAX EVASION
dc.type	Article
dc.date.updated	2022-05-19T05:14:52Z
dc.contributor.department	DEAN'S OFFICE (LKY SCH OF PUBLIC POLICY)
dc.description.doi	10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110046
dc.description.sourcetitle	ECONOMICS LETTERS
dc.description.volume	207
dc.published.state	Published
Appears in Collections:	Staff Publications Elements

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