Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Last-round and Joint First/Last-Round Power Analysis Attacks on PRESENT
Authors: Qiang Fang
Alioto,Massimo Bruno 
Keywords: CPA
bit permutation
bit regrouping
joint first/last-round attacks
Top-N guess combination
Issue Date: 14-Feb-2022
Publisher: IEEE
Citation: Qiang Fang, Alioto,Massimo Bruno (2022-02-14). Last-round and Joint First/Last-Round Power Analysis Attacks on PRESENT. 2021 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST) : 1-6. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Related Dataset(s): 10.1109/AsianHOST53231.2021.9699610
Abstract: This paper explores new power analysis attacks on cryptographic circuits based on the PRESENT cipher, and discloses an unreported vulnerability of this cipher. For the first time, an attack to the last round is introduced to identify the secret key based on the knowledge of ciphertext, as opposed to conventional attacks based on the first round (i.e., knowledge of plaintext). This attack is enabled by the analysis of the bit-permutation structure in the last round, and by introducing a suitable bit regrouping strategy. As further contribution, a more powerful attack combining first/last-round Correlation Power Analysis attacks with Top-N guess strategy is demonstrated. The analysis and the attack results show that the optimal choice of Top-N key guesses makes the proposed attack more powerful than a conventional single-round attack, reducing the number of power traces required by 34%.
Source Title: 2021 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST)
DOI: 10.1109/AsianHOST53231.2021.9699610
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications
Students Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormatAccess SettingsVersion 
post_print_paper_1_AsianHOST_2021.pdfpost-print version1.51 MBAdobe PDF



Google ScholarTM



Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.