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|Title:||Common agency with risk-averse agent||Authors:||Semenov, A.||Keywords:||Asymmetric information
|Issue Date:||2010||Citation:||Semenov, A. (2010). Common agency with risk-averse agent. Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (1) : 38-49. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009||Abstract:||In a common agency model with a risk-averse agent and private information distortion in the equilibrium policy from the first-best is greater compared to the case of a risk-neutral agent. The principals are unable to screen completely the agent's preferences if he is sufficiently risk-averse: there is bunching in the contract. The contribution schedules keep track of informational externality. However, when the coefficient of risk-aversion goes to zero the contributions become truthful as in the complete information case. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.||Source Title:||Journal of Mathematical Economics||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/22357||ISSN:||03044068||DOI:||10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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