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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009
DC FieldValue
dc.titleCommon agency with risk-averse agent
dc.contributor.authorSemenov, A.
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-03T08:09:00Z
dc.date.available2011-05-03T08:09:00Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationSemenov, A. (2010). Common agency with risk-averse agent. Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (1) : 38-49. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009
dc.identifier.issn03044068
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/22357
dc.description.abstractIn a common agency model with a risk-averse agent and private information distortion in the equilibrium policy from the first-best is greater compared to the case of a risk-neutral agent. The principals are unable to screen completely the agent's preferences if he is sufficiently risk-averse: there is bunching in the contract. The contribution schedules keep track of informational externality. However, when the coefficient of risk-aversion goes to zero the contributions become truthful as in the complete information case. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectAsymmetric information
dc.subjectCommon agency
dc.subjectRisk-aversion
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009
dc.description.sourcetitleJournal of Mathematical Economics
dc.description.volume46
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.page38-49
dc.description.codenJMECD
dc.identifier.isiut000273511400005
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