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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009
| Title: | Common agency with risk-averse agent | Authors: | Semenov, A. | Keywords: | Asymmetric information Common agency Risk-aversion |
Issue Date: | 2010 | Citation: | Semenov, A. (2010). Common agency with risk-averse agent. Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (1) : 38-49. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009 | Abstract: | In a common agency model with a risk-averse agent and private information distortion in the equilibrium policy from the first-best is greater compared to the case of a risk-neutral agent. The principals are unable to screen completely the agent's preferences if he is sufficiently risk-averse: there is bunching in the contract. The contribution schedules keep track of informational externality. However, when the coefficient of risk-aversion goes to zero the contributions become truthful as in the complete information case. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | Source Title: | Journal of Mathematical Economics | URI: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/22357 | ISSN: | 03044068 | DOI: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009 |
| Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
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