Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009
Title: Common agency with risk-averse agent
Authors: Semenov, A. 
Keywords: Asymmetric information
Common agency
Risk-aversion
Issue Date: 2010
Source: Semenov, A. (2010). Common agency with risk-averse agent. Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (1) : 38-49. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009
Abstract: In a common agency model with a risk-averse agent and private information distortion in the equilibrium policy from the first-best is greater compared to the case of a risk-neutral agent. The principals are unable to screen completely the agent's preferences if he is sufficiently risk-averse: there is bunching in the contract. The contribution schedules keep track of informational externality. However, when the coefficient of risk-aversion goes to zero the contributions become truthful as in the complete information case. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Source Title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/22357
ISSN: 03044068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.009
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