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Title: Satellite quantum communications when man-in-the-middle attacks are excluded
Authors: Vergoossen, T. 
Bedington, R. 
Grieve, J.A. 
Ling, A. 
Keywords: Access control
Photon key distribution
Quantum communication
Quantum cryptography
Quantum key distribution
Satellite QKD
Threat model
Issue Date: 2019
Publisher: MDPI AG
Citation: Vergoossen, T., Bedington, R., Grieve, J.A., Ling, A. (2019). Satellite quantum communications when man-in-the-middle attacks are excluded. Entropy 21 (4) : 387. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Rights: Attribution 4.0 International
Abstract: An application of quantum communications is the transmission of qubits to create shared symmetric encryption keys in a process called quantum key distribution (QKD). Contrary to public-private key encryption, symmetric encryption is considered safe from (quantum) computing attacks, i.e. it provides forward security and is thus attractive for secure communications. In this paper we argue that for free-space quantum communications, especially with satellites, if one assumes that man-in-the-middle attacks can be detected by classical channel monitoring techniques, simplified quantum communications protocols and hardware systems can be implemented that offer improved key rates. We term these protocols photon key distribution (PKD) to differentiate them from the standard QKD protocols. We identify three types of photon sources and calculate asymptotic secret key rates for PKD protocols and compare them to their QKD counterparts. PKD protocols use only one measurement basis which we show roughly doubles the key rates. Furthermore, with the relaxed security assumptions one can establish keys at very high losses, in contrast to QKD where at the same losses privacy amplification would make key generation impossible. © 2019 by the authors.
Source Title: Entropy
ISSN: 10994300
DOI: 10.3390/e21040387
Rights: Attribution 4.0 International
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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