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|Title:||Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies||Authors:||Sun, Y.
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|Issue Date:||2007||Citation:||Sun, Y., Yannelis, N.C. (2007). Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies. Games and Economic Behavior 61 (1) : 131-155. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001||Abstract:||We consider a perfectly competitive ex ante economy with a continuum of agents and negligible asymmetric information. For such an economy we recast the basic classical results on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, core equivalence, and the blocking size of coalitions. Moreover, we examine the incentive compatibility of the ex ante Pareto, core and Walrasian allocations.©2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.||Source Title:||Games and Economic Behavior||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/19990||ISSN:||08998256
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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