Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001
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dc.titleCore, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
dc.contributor.authorSun, Y.
dc.contributor.authorYannelis, N.C.
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-24T06:55:19Z
dc.date.available2011-02-24T06:55:19Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationSun, Y., Yannelis, N.C. (2007). Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies. Games and Economic Behavior 61 (1) : 131-155. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001
dc.identifier.issn08998256
dc.identifier.issn10902473
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/19990
dc.description.abstractWe consider a perfectly competitive ex ante economy with a continuum of agents and negligible asymmetric information. For such an economy we recast the basic classical results on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, core equivalence, and the blocking size of coalitions. Moreover, we examine the incentive compatibility of the ex ante Pareto, core and Walrasian allocations.©2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectAsymmetric information
dc.subjectCore
dc.subjectIncentive compatibility
dc.subjectNegligible private information
dc.subjectPareto efficiency
dc.subjectWalrasian allocation
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001
dc.description.sourcetitleGames and Economic Behavior
dc.description.volume61
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.page131-155
dc.description.codenGEBEE
dc.identifier.isiut000250254100007
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