Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001
Title: Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
Authors: Sun, Y. 
Yannelis, N.C.
Keywords: Asymmetric information
Core
Incentive compatibility
Negligible private information
Pareto efficiency
Walrasian allocation
Issue Date: 2007
Source: Sun, Y., Yannelis, N.C. (2007). Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies. Games and Economic Behavior 61 (1) : 131-155. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001
Abstract: We consider a perfectly competitive ex ante economy with a continuum of agents and negligible asymmetric information. For such an economy we recast the basic classical results on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, core equivalence, and the blocking size of coalitions. Moreover, we examine the incentive compatibility of the ex ante Pareto, core and Walrasian allocations.©2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Source Title: Games and Economic Behavior
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/19990
ISSN: 08998256
10902473
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001
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