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Title: Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
Authors: He, W.
Sun, Y. 
Keywords: almost perfect information
atomless reference measure
atomless transition
Dynamic games
perfect information
subgame-perfect equilibrium
Issue Date: 2020
Publisher: Society for Economic Theory
Citation: He, W., Sun, Y. (2020). Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information. Theoretical Economics 15 (2) : 811-859. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
Abstract: This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite- or infinite-horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e., almost perfect information), which go beyond previous works in the sense that stagewise public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. For alternating move (i.e., perfect-information) dynamic games with uncertainty, we show the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria as well as the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs, extending the earlier results on perfect-information deterministic dynamic games. Copyright © 2020 The Authors.
Source Title: Theoretical Economics
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/TE2927
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
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