Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2927
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dc.titleDynamic games with (almost) perfect information
dc.contributor.authorHe, W.
dc.contributor.authorSun, Y.
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-10T03:02:46Z
dc.date.available2021-08-10T03:02:46Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationHe, W., Sun, Y. (2020). Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information. Theoretical Economics 15 (2) : 811-859. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2927
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/196163
dc.description.abstractThis paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite- or infinite-horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e., almost perfect information), which go beyond previous works in the sense that stagewise public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. For alternating move (i.e., perfect-information) dynamic games with uncertainty, we show the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria as well as the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs, extending the earlier results on perfect-information deterministic dynamic games. Copyright © 2020 The Authors.
dc.publisherSociety for Economic Theory
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.sourceScopus OA2020
dc.subjectalmost perfect information
dc.subjectatomless reference measure
dc.subjectatomless transition
dc.subjectC62
dc.subjectC73
dc.subjectDynamic games
dc.subjectperfect information
dc.subjectsubgame-perfect equilibrium
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentDEPT OF ECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.3982/TE2927
dc.description.sourcetitleTheoretical Economics
dc.description.volume15
dc.description.issue2
dc.description.page811-859
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