Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12155
| Title: | The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law | Authors: | Khoo, Kenneth Soh, Jerold |
Issue Date: | Mar-2020 | Publisher: | Wiley | Citation: | Khoo, Kenneth, Soh, Jerold (2020-03). The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law. American Business Law Journal 57 (1) : 45-111. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12155 | Source Title: | American Business Law Journal | URI: | https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/165806 | ISSN: | 0002-7766 1744-1714 |
DOI: | 10.1111/ablj.12155 |
| Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications Elements |
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| File | Description | Size | Format | Access Settings | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Inefficiency SSRN Version.pdf | Accepted version | 601.77 kB | Adobe PDF | OPEN | Post-print | View/Download |
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