The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12155

DC Field	Value
dc.title	The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law
dc.contributor.author	Khoo, Kenneth
dc.contributor.author	Soh, Jerold
dc.date.accessioned	2020-03-20T02:31:36Z
dc.date.available	2020-03-20T02:31:36Z
dc.date.issued	2020-03
dc.identifier.citation	Khoo, Kenneth, Soh, Jerold (2020-03). The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law. American Business Law Journal 57 (1) : 45-111. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12155
dc.identifier.issn	0002-7766
dc.identifier.issn	1744-1714
dc.identifier.uri	https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/165806
dc.publisher	Wiley
dc.source	Elements
dc.type	Article
dc.date.updated	2020-03-19T19:45:48Z
dc.contributor.department	LAW
dc.description.doi	10.1111/ablj.12155
dc.description.sourcetitle	American Business Law Journal
dc.description.volume	57
dc.description.issue	1
dc.description.page	45-111
dc.published.state	Published
Appears in Collections:	Staff Publications Elements

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