Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9258-7
Title: Procedural Moral Enhancement
Authors: Schaefer G.O. 
Savulescu J.
Keywords: Moral enhancement
Proceduralism
Rawls
Reliability
Issue Date: 2019
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Citation: Schaefer G.O., Savulescu J. (2019). Procedural Moral Enhancement. Neuroethics 12 (1) : 73-84. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9258-7
Abstract: While philosophers are often concerned with the conditions for moral knowledge or justification, in practice something arguably less demanding is just as, if not more, important – reliably making correct moral judgments. Judges and juries should hand down fair sentences, government officials should decide on just laws, members of ethics committees should make sound recommendations, and so on. We want such agents, more often than not and as often as possible, to make the right decisions. The purpose of this paper is to propose a method of enhancing the moral reliability of such agents. In particular, we advocate for a procedural approach; certain internal processes generally contribute to people’s moral reliability. Building on the early work of Rawls, we identify several particular factors related to moral reasoning that are specific enough to be the target of practical intervention: logical competence, conceptual understanding, empirical competence, openness, empathy and bias. Improving on these processes can in turn make people more morally reliable in a variety of contexts and has implications for recent debates over moral enhancement. © 2016, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
Source Title: Neuroethics
URI: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/156595
ISSN: 18745490
DOI: 10.1007/s12152-016-9258-7
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