Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Optimal social security in a dynastic model with investment externalities and endogenous fertility||Authors:||Zhang, J.
|Issue Date:||Nov-2007||Citation:||Zhang, J., Zhang, J. (2007-11). Optimal social security in a dynastic model with investment externalities and endogenous fertility. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31 (11) : 3545-3567. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.005||Abstract:||This paper studies optimal pay-as-you-go social security with investment externalities, positive bequests and endogenous fertility. With an investment externality, a competitive solution without social security suffers from under-investment in capital and over-reproduction of population. We show the existence of time-consistent optimal social security that improves welfare by reducing fertility and increasing capital intensity. We also illustrate numerically that a small degree of this externality can justify the observed high ratios of social security spending to GDP. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.||Source Title:||Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/132294||ISSN:||01651889||DOI:||10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.005|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on Oct 18, 2021
WEB OF SCIENCETM
checked on Sep 25, 2021
checked on Oct 14, 2021
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.