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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.005
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dc.titleOptimal social security in a dynastic model with investment externalities and endogenous fertility
dc.contributor.authorZhang, J.
dc.contributor.authorZhang, J.
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-13T05:30:50Z
dc.date.available2016-12-13T05:30:50Z
dc.date.issued2007-11
dc.identifier.citationZhang, J., Zhang, J. (2007-11). Optimal social security in a dynastic model with investment externalities and endogenous fertility. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31 (11) : 3545-3567. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.005
dc.identifier.issn01651889
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/132294
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies optimal pay-as-you-go social security with investment externalities, positive bequests and endogenous fertility. With an investment externality, a competitive solution without social security suffers from under-investment in capital and over-reproduction of population. We show the existence of time-consistent optimal social security that improves welfare by reducing fertility and increasing capital intensity. We also illustrate numerically that a small degree of this externality can justify the observed high ratios of social security spending to GDP. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.005
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectBequests
dc.subjectExternality
dc.subjectFertility
dc.subjectSocial security
dc.subjectWelfare
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.005
dc.description.sourcetitleJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
dc.description.volume31
dc.description.issue11
dc.description.page3545-3567
dc.description.codenJEDCD
dc.identifier.isiut000250182200004
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