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|Title:||Why payment card fees are biased against retailers||Authors:||Wright, J.||Issue Date:||Dec-2012||Citation:||Wright, J. (2012-12). Why payment card fees are biased against retailers. RAND Journal of Economics 43 (4) : 761-780. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12007||Abstract:||I formalize the popular argument that retailers pay too much and cardholders too little to make use of payment card platforms, resulting in excessive use of cards. To do this, I analyze a standard two-sided market model of a payment card platform. With minimal additional restrictions, the model implies that the privately set fee structure is unambiguously biased against retailers in favor of cardholders, a result that continues to hold even if the platform can perfectly price discriminate on both sides. The market failure arising is primarily a regulatory problem and does not raise any competition concerns. © 2013, RAND.||Source Title:||RAND Journal of Economics||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/124300||ISSN:||07416261||DOI:||10.1111/1756-2171.12007|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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