Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Why payment card fees are biased against retailers||Authors:||Wright, J.||Issue Date:||Dec-2012||Citation:||Wright, J. (2012-12). Why payment card fees are biased against retailers. RAND Journal of Economics 43 (4) : 761-780. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12007||Abstract:||I formalize the popular argument that retailers pay too much and cardholders too little to make use of payment card platforms, resulting in excessive use of cards. To do this, I analyze a standard two-sided market model of a payment card platform. With minimal additional restrictions, the model implies that the privately set fee structure is unambiguously biased against retailers in favor of cardholders, a result that continues to hold even if the platform can perfectly price discriminate on both sides. The market failure arising is primarily a regulatory problem and does not raise any competition concerns. © 2013, RAND.||Source Title:||RAND Journal of Economics||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/124300||ISSN:||07416261||DOI:||10.1111/1756-2171.12007|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on Jun 13, 2019
WEB OF SCIENCETM
checked on Jun 5, 2019
checked on May 24, 2019
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.