Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12007
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dc.titleWhy payment card fees are biased against retailers
dc.contributor.authorWright, J.
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-01T10:13:38Z
dc.date.available2016-06-01T10:13:38Z
dc.date.issued2012-12
dc.identifier.citationWright, J. (2012-12). Why payment card fees are biased against retailers. RAND Journal of Economics 43 (4) : 761-780. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12007
dc.identifier.issn07416261
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/124300
dc.description.abstractI formalize the popular argument that retailers pay too much and cardholders too little to make use of payment card platforms, resulting in excessive use of cards. To do this, I analyze a standard two-sided market model of a payment card platform. With minimal additional restrictions, the model implies that the privately set fee structure is unambiguously biased against retailers in favor of cardholders, a result that continues to hold even if the platform can perfectly price discriminate on both sides. The market failure arising is primarily a regulatory problem and does not raise any competition concerns. © 2013, RAND.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12007
dc.sourceScopus
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1111/1756-2171.12007
dc.description.sourcetitleRAND Journal of Economics
dc.description.volume43
dc.description.issue4
dc.description.page761-780
dc.identifier.isiut000313990500008
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