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https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354
Title: | Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents? | Authors: | Shachat, J. Todd Swarthout, J. |
Issue Date: | Jul-2004 | Citation: | Shachat, J., Todd Swarthout, J. (2004-07). Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 59 (3) : 359-373. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354 | Abstract: | We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data. © Springer-Verlag 2004. | Source Title: | Mathematical Methods of Operations Research | URI: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/114212 | ISSN: | 14322994 | DOI: | 10.1007/s001860400354 |
Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
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