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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354
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dc.titleDo we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?
dc.contributor.authorShachat, J.
dc.contributor.authorTodd Swarthout, J.
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-02T02:49:32Z
dc.date.available2014-12-02T02:49:32Z
dc.date.issued2004-07
dc.identifier.citationShachat, J., Todd Swarthout, J. (2004-07). Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 59 (3) : 359-373. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354
dc.identifier.issn14322994
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/114212
dc.description.abstractWe conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data. © Springer-Verlag 2004.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354
dc.sourceScopus
dc.typeConference Paper
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1007/s001860400354
dc.description.sourcetitleMathematical Methods of Operations Research
dc.description.volume59
dc.description.issue3
dc.description.page359-373
dc.identifier.isiut000222646100003
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