Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354

Title:	Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?
Authors:	Shachat, J. Todd Swarthout, J.
Issue Date:	Jul-2004
Citation:	Shachat, J., Todd Swarthout, J. (2004-07). Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 59 (3) : 359-373. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354
Abstract:	We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data. © Springer-Verlag 2004.
Source Title:	Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
URI:	http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/114212
ISSN:	14322994
DOI:	10.1007/s001860400354
Appears in Collections:	Staff Publications

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