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|Title:||Auction-based vs. incentive-based Multiple-Cloud orchestration mechanisms||Authors:||Iyer, G.N.
|Issue Date:||2012||Citation:||Iyer, G.N.,Chandrasekaran, R.,Veeravalli, B. (2012). Auction-based vs. incentive-based Multiple-Cloud orchestration mechanisms. Proceeding - COMNETSAT 2012: 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communication, Networks and Satellite : 1-5. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1109/ComNetSat.2012.6380765||Abstract:||With the vast number of isolated and independent Cloud Service Providers (CSP) existing at present, it is challenging for the users to choose an appropriate CSP. In this paper, we propose two Multiple-Cloud orchestration mechanisms, one based on auction theory and the other based on incentives to address this issue. By connecting the CSPs and users through a Broker, we create a marketplace in which, the Broker maintains some information pertaining to both users and CSPs in order to help them in making appropriate decisions from time to time. Through extensive performance evaluation studies, we show the effectiveness of our schemes compared to the current Cloud environments without the Broker. Our performance evaluation studies show that our schemes enable the CSPs to offer competitive prices for same types of resources and gives flexibility for users to prioritize their requirements to choose an appropriate CSP. Further, we show that our scheme gives a fair treatment to all CSPs under certain conditions. Finally, we show that our schemes can seamlessly handle CSPs offering multiple types of resources and users having diverse requirements. © 2012 IEEE.||Source Title:||Proceeding - COMNETSAT 2012: 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communication, Networks and Satellite||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/69461||ISBN:||9781467308892||DOI:||10.1109/ComNetSat.2012.6380765|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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