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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010
| Title: | The e-mail game phenomenon | Authors: | Chen, Y.-C. Xiong, S. |
Keywords: | Common knowledge Critical types E-mail game Games with incomplete information Higher-order beliefs |
Issue Date: | Jul-2013 | Citation: | Chen, Y.-C., Xiong, S. (2013-07). The e-mail game phenomenon. Games and Economic Behavior 80 : 147-156. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010 | Abstract: | The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis - types in finite or common-prior models - display strategic discontinuity in simple games. © 2013 Elsevier Inc. | Source Title: | Games and Economic Behavior | URI: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/52088 | ISSN: | 08998256 | DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010 |
| Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
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