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|Title:||The e-mail game phenomenon|
|Authors:||Chen, Y.-C. |
Games with incomplete information
|Citation:||Chen, Y.-C., Xiong, S. (2013-07). The e-mail game phenomenon. Games and Economic Behavior 80 : 147-156. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010|
|Abstract:||The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis - types in finite or common-prior models - display strategic discontinuity in simple games. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.|
|Source Title:||Games and Economic Behavior|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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