Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010
Title: The e-mail game phenomenon
Authors: Chen, Y.-C. 
Xiong, S.
Keywords: Common knowledge
Critical types
E-mail game
Games with incomplete information
Higher-order beliefs
Issue Date: Jul-2013
Source: Chen, Y.-C., Xiong, S. (2013-07). The e-mail game phenomenon. Games and Economic Behavior 80 : 147-156. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010
Abstract: The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis - types in finite or common-prior models - display strategic discontinuity in simple games. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
Source Title: Games and Economic Behavior
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/52088
ISSN: 08998256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010
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