Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11116-010-9298-5
Title: Sealed v/s open bids for certificates of entitlement under the vehicle quota system in Singapore
Authors: Chu, S. 
Keywords: Certificate of entitlement
Open bid
Sealed bid
Traffic management
Uniform price auction
Vehicle quota system
Issue Date: 2011
Citation: Chu, S. (2011). Sealed v/s open bids for certificates of entitlement under the vehicle quota system in Singapore. Transportation 38 (2) : 215-226. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11116-010-9298-5
Abstract: The Vehicle Quota System manages vehicle ownership in Singapore by making the procurement of a Certificate of Entitlement (COE) a prerequisite for the registration of a new vehicle. The procurement is done during uniform price auctions of quotas of COEs currently held on a twice-a-month schedule. The auction format which started out as sealed bids in May 1990 changed to open bids in July 2001. This paper uses a regression model framework to investigate if this shift in auction format has resulted in lower COE premium volatility and a better reflection of demand and supply forces. The empirical results are pertinent to transport policy analysis. A suggestion in the form of incentives for early bids is also made to improve the efficiency of the open bids auction. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
Source Title: Transportation
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/44121
ISSN: 00494488
DOI: 10.1007/s11116-010-9298-5
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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