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|Title:||Sealed v/s open bids for certificates of entitlement under the vehicle quota system in Singapore|
|Keywords:||Certificate of entitlement|
Uniform price auction
Vehicle quota system
|Source:||Chu, S. (2011). Sealed v/s open bids for certificates of entitlement under the vehicle quota system in Singapore. Transportation 38 (2) : 215-226. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11116-010-9298-5|
|Abstract:||The Vehicle Quota System manages vehicle ownership in Singapore by making the procurement of a Certificate of Entitlement (COE) a prerequisite for the registration of a new vehicle. The procurement is done during uniform price auctions of quotas of COEs currently held on a twice-a-month schedule. The auction format which started out as sealed bids in May 1990 changed to open bids in July 2001. This paper uses a regression model framework to investigate if this shift in auction format has resulted in lower COE premium volatility and a better reflection of demand and supply forces. The empirical results are pertinent to transport policy analysis. A suggestion in the form of incentives for early bids is also made to improve the efficiency of the open bids auction. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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