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|Title:||TWO CONCEPTIONS OF SIMILARITY||Authors:||Blumson, Ben||Keywords:||Arts & Humanities
|Issue Date:||1-Jan-2018||Publisher:||WILEY||Citation:||Blumson, Ben (2018-01-01). TWO CONCEPTIONS OF SIMILARITY. PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 68 (270) : 21-37. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx021||Abstract:||There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first, the degree of dissimilarity between two particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. According to the second, the degree of similarity between two particulars is a function of the number of (sparse) properties they have in common and not in common. This paper argues that these two conceptions are logically independent, but philosophically inconsonant.||Source Title:||PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY||URI:||https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/229859||ISSN:||00318094
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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