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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2021118829
Title: Generic Animalism
Authors: Bailey, Andrew M
van Elswyk, Peter
Issue Date: Aug-2021
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Citation: Bailey, Andrew M, van Elswyk, Peter (2021-08). Generic Animalism. The Journal of Philosophy 118 (8) : 405-429. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2021118829
Abstract: The animalist says we are animals. This thesis is commonly understood as the universal generalization that all human persons are human animals. This article proposes an alternative: the thesis is a generic that admits of exceptions. We defend the resulting view, which we call ‘generic animalism’, and show its aptitude for diagnosing the limits of eight case-based objections to animalism.
Source Title: The Journal of Philosophy
URI: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/200852
ISSN: 0022362X
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2021118829
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