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Title: Descartes' dualism and contemporary dualism
Authors: Wee, C. 
Pelczar, M. 
Issue Date: 2008
Citation: Wee, C., Pelczar, M. (2008). Descartes' dualism and contemporary dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1) : 145-160. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: After drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism - numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience) - we argue that Descartes is a numerical dualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes' views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed.
Source Title: Southern Journal of Philosophy
ISSN: 00384283
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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