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|Title:||Making evildoers pay: Resource-competitive broadcast in sensor networks|
|Authors:||Gilbert, S. |
|Keywords:||byzantine fault tolerance|
resource competitive analysis
wireless sensor networks
|Source:||Gilbert, S.,Young, M. (2012). Making evildoers pay: Resource-competitive broadcast in sensor networks. Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing : 145-154. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1145/2332432.2332461|
|Abstract:||Consider a time-slotted, single-hop, wireless sensor network consisting of n correct devices and and f·n Byzantine devices where f ≥ 0 is any constant; the Byzantine devices may or may not outnumber the correct ones. There exists a trusted sender Alice who wishes to deliver a message m over a single channel to the correct devices. There is also an evil user Carol who controls the Byzantine devices and uses them to disrupt the communication channel. For a constant k ≥ 2, the correct and Byzantine devices each possess a meager energy budget of O(n 1/k), Alice and Carol each possess a limited budget of Õ;(n 1/k), and sending or listening in a slot incurs unit cost. This setup captures the inherent challenges of guaranteeing communication despite scarce resources and attacks on the network. Given this Alice versus Carol scenario, we ask: Is communication of m feasible and, if so, at what cost? We develop a protocol which, for an arbitrarily small constant ε > 0, ensures that at least (1-ε)n correct devices receive m with high probability. Furthermore, if Carol's devices expend T energy jamming the channel, then Alice and the correct devices each spend only Õ(T 1/(k+1)). In other words, delaying the transmission of m forces a jamming adversary to rapidly deplete its energy supply and, consequently, cease attacks on the network. © 2012 ACM.|
|Source Title:||Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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