Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://doi.org/10.1145/2332432.2332461
DC Field | Value | |
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dc.title | Making evildoers pay: Resource-competitive broadcast in sensor networks | |
dc.contributor.author | Gilbert, S. | |
dc.contributor.author | Young, M. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-07-04T07:53:20Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-07-04T07:53:20Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Gilbert, S.,Young, M. (2012). Making evildoers pay: Resource-competitive broadcast in sensor networks. Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing : 145-154. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2332432.2332461" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1145/2332432.2332461</a> | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9781450314503 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/39952 | |
dc.description.abstract | Consider a time-slotted, single-hop, wireless sensor network consisting of n correct devices and and f·n Byzantine devices where f ≥ 0 is any constant; the Byzantine devices may or may not outnumber the correct ones. There exists a trusted sender Alice who wishes to deliver a message m over a single channel to the correct devices. There is also an evil user Carol who controls the Byzantine devices and uses them to disrupt the communication channel. For a constant k ≥ 2, the correct and Byzantine devices each possess a meager energy budget of O(n 1/k), Alice and Carol each possess a limited budget of Õ;(n 1/k), and sending or listening in a slot incurs unit cost. This setup captures the inherent challenges of guaranteeing communication despite scarce resources and attacks on the network. Given this Alice versus Carol scenario, we ask: Is communication of m feasible and, if so, at what cost? We develop a protocol which, for an arbitrarily small constant ε > 0, ensures that at least (1-ε)n correct devices receive m with high probability. Furthermore, if Carol's devices expend T energy jamming the channel, then Alice and the correct devices each spend only Õ(T 1/(k+1)). In other words, delaying the transmission of m forces a jamming adversary to rapidly deplete its energy supply and, consequently, cease attacks on the network. © 2012 ACM. | |
dc.description.uri | http://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2332432.2332461 | |
dc.source | Scopus | |
dc.subject | byzantine fault tolerance | |
dc.subject | energy efficiency | |
dc.subject | jamming attacks | |
dc.subject | resource competitive analysis | |
dc.subject | wireless sensor networks | |
dc.type | Conference Paper | |
dc.contributor.department | COMPUTER SCIENCE | |
dc.description.doi | 10.1145/2332432.2332461 | |
dc.description.sourcetitle | Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing | |
dc.description.page | 145-154 | |
dc.description.coden | 85LRA | |
dc.identifier.isiut | NOT_IN_WOS | |
Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
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