Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.peva.2013.08.015
DC FieldValue
dc.titlePrice differentiation and control in the Kelly mechanism
dc.contributor.authorYang, Y.
dc.contributor.authorMa, R.T.B.
dc.contributor.authorLui, J.C.S.
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-04T03:10:09Z
dc.date.available2014-07-04T03:10:09Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationYang, Y., Ma, R.T.B., Lui, J.C.S. (2013). Price differentiation and control in the Kelly mechanism. Performance Evaluation 70 (10) : 792-805. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.peva.2013.08.015
dc.identifier.issn01665316
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/77903
dc.description.abstractThe design and implementation of resource allocation and pricing for computing and network resources are crucial for system and user performance. Among various designing objectives, we target on maximizing the social welfare, i.e., the summation of all user utilities. The challenge comes from the fact that users are autonomous and their utilities are unknown to the system designer. Under the Kelly mechanism, users bid and proportionally share resources. When user population is large and "price-taking" can be assumed, the Kelly mechanism maximizes the social welfare; however, under oligopolistic competitions, this mechanism might induce an efficiency loss up to 25% of the welfare optimum. We generalize the Kelly mechanism by designing a price differentiation and show that the efficiency gap can be closed. In particular, we analyze the resource competition game under the generalized mechanism and show that any price differentiation induces a unique Nash equilibrium and any non-dictatorial resource allocation can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium under price differentiation. We further characterize the optimality condition under which the social welfare is maximized. Based on this optimality condition, we design a feedback price control mechanism that takes observable system parameters as input and adapts to the optimal Nash equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.peva.2013.08.015
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectNash equilibrium
dc.subjectPrice differentiation
dc.subjectResource allocation
dc.subjectSocial welfare
dc.subjectThe Kelly mechanism
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentCOMPUTER SCIENCE
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.peva.2013.08.015
dc.description.sourcetitlePerformance Evaluation
dc.description.volume70
dc.description.issue10
dc.description.page792-805
dc.description.codenPEEVD
dc.identifier.isiut000325953100008
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show simple item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

11
checked on Jan 12, 2022

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

10
checked on Jan 12, 2022

Page view(s)

139
checked on Jan 13, 2022

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.