Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/12/12/123019
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dc.titleFinite-key security against coherent attacks in quantum key distribution
dc.contributor.authorSheridan, L.
dc.contributor.authorLe, T.P.
dc.contributor.authorScarani, V.
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-19T02:52:06Z
dc.date.available2014-05-19T02:52:06Z
dc.date.issued2010-12
dc.identifier.citationSheridan, L., Le, T.P., Scarani, V. (2010-12). Finite-key security against coherent attacks in quantum key distribution. New Journal of Physics 12 : -. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/12/12/123019
dc.identifier.issn13672630
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/52939
dc.description.abstractChristandl et al (2009 Phys. Rev. Lett. 102 020504) provide, in particular, the possibility of studying unconditional security in the finite-key regime for all discrete-variable protocols. We spell out this bound from their general formalism. Then, we apply it in the analysis of a recently proposed protocol (Laing et al 2010 Phys. Rev. A 82 012304). This protocol is meaningful when the alignment of Alice's and Bob's reference frames is not monitored and may vary with time. In this scenario, the notion of asymptotic key rate has hardly any operational meaning, because if one waits too long a time, the average correlations are smeared out and no security can be inferred. Therefore, finitekey analysis is necessary for finding the maximal achievable secret key rate and the corresponding optimal number of signals. © IOP Publishing Ltd and Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft.
dc.sourceScopus
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentCENTRE FOR QUANTUM TECHNOLOGIES
dc.contributor.departmentPHYSICS
dc.description.doi10.1088/1367-2630/12/12/123019
dc.description.sourcetitleNew Journal of Physics
dc.description.volume12
dc.description.page-
dc.identifier.isiut000285583300006
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