Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x
DC FieldValue
dc.titleCorporate governance and risk-taking
dc.contributor.authorJohn, K.
dc.contributor.authorLitov, L.
dc.contributor.authorYeung, B.
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-09T06:54:11Z
dc.date.available2013-10-09T06:54:11Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationJohn, K., Litov, L., Yeung, B. (2008). Corporate governance and risk-taking. Journal of Finance 63 (4) : 1679-1728. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x
dc.identifier.issn00221082
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/44323
dc.description.abstractBetter investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk-avoidance. Further, in better investor protection environments, stakeholders like creditors, labor groups, and the government are less effective in reducing corporate risk-taking for their self-interest. However, arguments can also be made for a negative relationship between investor protection and risk-taking. Using a cross-country panel and a U.S.-only sample, we find that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection. © 2008 The American Finance Association.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x
dc.sourceScopus
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentBUSINESS POLICY
dc.description.doi10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x
dc.description.sourcetitleJournal of Finance
dc.description.volume63
dc.description.issue4
dc.description.page1679-1728
dc.identifier.isiut000257780200005
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