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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.03.011
| Title: | Contest with pre-contest investment | Authors: | Fu, Q. Lu, J. |
Keywords: | Contest Effort supply Pre-contest investment Preemptive incentive Shortlisting |
Issue Date: | 2009 | Citation: | Fu, Q., Lu, J. (2009). Contest with pre-contest investment. Economics Letters 103 (3) : 142-145. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.03.011 | Abstract: | In a standard noisy contest, more competition (more contestants) leads to lower individual equilibrium effort. We show that when contestants can make pre-contest investment to enhance their competency, neither equilibrium investment nor individual effort is monotonic in the number of contestants. Individual effort may increase with the level of participation. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | Source Title: | Economics Letters | URI: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/44278 | ISSN: | 01651765 | DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.03.011 |
| Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
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