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Title: Contest with pre-contest investment
Authors: Fu, Q. 
Lu, J.
Keywords: Contest
Effort supply
Pre-contest investment
Preemptive incentive
Issue Date: 2009
Citation: Fu, Q., Lu, J. (2009). Contest with pre-contest investment. Economics Letters 103 (3) : 142-145. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: In a standard noisy contest, more competition (more contestants) leads to lower individual equilibrium effort. We show that when contestants can make pre-contest investment to enhance their competency, neither equilibrium investment nor individual effort is monotonic in the number of contestants. Individual effort may increase with the level of participation. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Source Title: Economics Letters
ISSN: 01651765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.03.011
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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