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|Title:||DoS-resistant access control protocol with identity confidentiality for wireless networks||Authors:||Wan, Z.
|Issue Date:||2005||Citation:||Wan, Z.,Zhu, B.,Deng, R.H.,Bao, F.,Ananda, A.L. (2005). DoS-resistant access control protocol with identity confidentiality for wireless networks. IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 3 : 1521-1526. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2005.1424740||Abstract:||In this paper we review a PKC (Public Key Cryptosystem) based protocol, referred to as the Stanford protocol, aiming to overcome several security deficiencies in IEEE 802.1X and to provide access control in both wireless and wired networks. One main objective of the Stanford protocol is to provide DoS resistance for the wireless network. Meanwhile, in the wireless environment, identity confidentiality of the mobile user is especially important since disclosed identity could be used to locate the user and track his movement. But our analysis shows that the Stanford protocol fails to fulfill these requirements. So we propose a new PKC-based protocol that not only provides DoS resistance and perfect forward secrecy, but also provides identity anonymity for the clients. We also present detailed security and performance analysis for our protocol, and show that our protocol is secure and efficient for access control in wireless networks. © 2005 IEEE.||Source Title:||IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/41611||ISBN:||0780389662||ISSN:||15253511||DOI:||10.1109/WCNC.2005.1424740|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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