Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2016.0543
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dc.titlePUBLIC GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND FIRM INNOVATION: AN EXAMINATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
dc.contributor.authorJia, Nan
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Kenneth G
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Cyndi Man
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-28T03:29:49Z
dc.date.available2023-07-28T03:29:49Z
dc.date.issued2019-02-01
dc.identifier.citationJia, Nan, Huang, Kenneth G, Zhang, Cyndi Man (2019-02-01). PUBLIC GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND FIRM INNOVATION: AN EXAMINATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES. ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 62 (1) : 220-247. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2016.0543
dc.identifier.issn0001-4273
dc.identifier.issn1948-0989
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/243601
dc.description.abstractInnovation activities create substantial firm value, but they are difficult to manage owing to agency risk, which is commonly thought to result in shirking, and hence underinvestment in innovation. However, agency risk can also create inefficient allocation of resources among innovation activities, on which the literature has provided limited understanding. We examine an important outcome created by agency risk—that agents pursue quantity of innovation at the expense of novelty—and investigate how it is influenced by corporate and public governance. We theorize that improved corporate governance tools, including better alignment of agents’ private incentives and stronger monitoring, and high-quality public governance reduce such agency risk in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Furthermore, higher-quality public governance enhances the functioning of corporate governance tools in further reducing such agency risk in innovation. We test our theory by examining SOEs in China that responded to the state’s pro-innovation policies relying disproportionately on quantifiable outcomes (e.g., patent counts) for assessing innovation performance. Our difference-in-differences estimates provide overall support for our hypotheses. These findings provide new insights on how agency risk affects innovation by distinguishing the consequences for quantity and novelty of innovation and for how conventional corporate governance tools shaping innovation depend on public governance.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherACAD MANAGEMENT
dc.sourceElements
dc.subjectSocial Sciences
dc.subjectBusiness
dc.subjectManagement
dc.subjectBusiness & Economics
dc.subjectRESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-RIGHTS
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS
dc.subjectINCENTIVE CONTRACTS
dc.subjectECONOMIC-GROWTH
dc.subjectPERFORMANCE
dc.subjectCHINA
dc.subjectAGENCY
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT
dc.typeArticle
dc.date.updated2023-07-27T19:01:15Z
dc.contributor.departmentINDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT
dc.description.doi10.5465/amj.2016.0543
dc.description.sourcetitleACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
dc.description.volume62
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.page220-247
dc.description.placeUnited States
dc.published.statePublished
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