PANDEMICS AREN’T WARS: REFRAMING PANDEMICS FROM SECURITY THREATS TO SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES

Abstract

Given the complex nature of pandemics, invoking a common and general understanding of the matter amongst the non-expert public may be useful for mobilising action and averting an imminent catastrophe. Frames proffer a means to establish such a common and general understanding because of their simplifying, yet explanatory nature. Hence, global pandemics have been framed as threats to state security using metaphors comparing them to war. For instance, lockdown policies are justified to “protect civilians” from the “enemy”, while healthcare workers become “soldiers” “fighting” on the “frontlines” of the “battleground”. The metaphor of war is a useful way to convey a sense of urgency and gravity. This galvanises a high level of fear, unites people against a perceived “common enemy”, justifies exceptional policy responses, and increases the speed of responses. Hence, framing pandemics as security threats appears to be an effective mechanism to bring exceptional policy responses to fruition. This thesis challenges this securitisation logic by highlighting the danger of framing pandemics as security threats - if the security frame is accepted by the audience, global health cooperation will be in peril. Unlike war, which is divisive in nature, pandemic responses require international cooperation to implement concerted, coordinated and collective responses. However, framing pandemics as security threats creates divisive identities of “us” versus an “enemy”, which shortens complex lines of causality and responsibility and fosters toxic nationalism wherein states and citizens focus on “winning the war” instead of on ensuring global health. Hence, I argue that pandemics that are successfully securitised are correlated with lower levels of international cooperation, while pandemics that are not successfully securitised are correlated with higher levels of international cooperation. Moreover, an alternative frame and narrative based on the logic of shared, but differentiated, responsibilities, may facilitate higher levels of international cooperation. This may also be a more effective model for global health governance because it shifts a political and security issue that primarily concerns states as unitary actors, to a global health issue that also prizes the role of non-state actors. I illustrate this argument by performing a comparative analysis of two pandemic cases - the 1918 Spanish Flu and the 2009 Swine Flu. My analysis demonstrates that the case that was successfully securitised (i.e. security frames achieved audience receptivity) resulted in lower levels of international cooperation as compared to the case that was unsuccessfully securitised (i.e. security frames did not receive audience acceptance). Specifically, levels of international cooperation were measured using three indicators - (1) presence and authority of a central coordinating institution, (2) robustness of the cooperation network, and (3) inclusivity and participation. The thesis then concludes with the broader policy implications of my findings. Particularly, it offers valuable policy insights for facilitating global cooperation on the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and on other “non-traditional security issues” like climate change, transnational crime and the international refugee regime