Optimal Orchestration of Rewards and Punishments in Rank-Order Contests

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594

DC Field	Value
dc.title	Optimal Orchestration of Rewards and Punishments in Rank-Order Contests
dc.contributor.author	Liu, Bin
dc.contributor.author	Lu, Jingfeng
dc.date.accessioned	2023-01-03T01:42:10Z
dc.date.available	2023-01-03T01:42:10Z
dc.date.issued	2022-12
dc.identifier.citation	Liu, Bin, Lu, Jingfeng (2022-12). Optimal Orchestration of Rewards and Punishments in Rank-Order Contests. Journal of Economic Theory : 105594-105594. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594
dc.identifier.issn	0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri	https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/235805
dc.publisher	Elsevier BV
dc.source	Elements
dc.subject	All-pay auction
dc.subject	Cross-rank/scenario transfer
dc.subject	Incomplete information
dc.subject	Negative prize
dc.subject	Optimal contest.
dc.type	Article
dc.date.updated	2022-12-29T01:59:54Z
dc.contributor.department	ECONOMICS
dc.description.doi	10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594
dc.description.sourcetitle	Journal of Economic Theory
dc.description.page	105594-105594
dc.published.state	Published
Appears in Collections:	Elements Staff Publications

File	Description	Size	Format	Access Settings	Version
prize_allocation Dec 2022 final.pdf		434.46 kB	Adobe PDF	OPEN	None	Available on 01-12-2024

Check