Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200206
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dc.titleDeposit Requirements in Auctions
dc.contributor.authorChe, Xiaogang
dc.contributor.authorLi, Tong
dc.contributor.authorLu, Jingfeng
dc.contributor.authorZheng, Xiaoyong
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-03T01:05:47Z
dc.date.available2023-01-03T01:05:47Z
dc.date.issued2022-11-01
dc.identifier.citationChe, Xiaogang, Li, Tong, Lu, Jingfeng, Zheng, Xiaoyong (2022-11-01). Deposit Requirements in Auctions. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14 (4) : 465-493. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200206
dc.identifier.issn1945-7669
dc.identifier.issn1945-7685
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/235798
dc.description.abstract<jats:p> We examine optimal auction design when buyers may receive future outside offers. The winning bidder may choose to default upon observing her outside offer. Under the optimal mechanism, the bidder with the highest value wins if and only if her value is above a cutoff, and the winner never defaults. The optimal auction takes the form of a second-price auction with a reserve price and a deposit by the winning bidder. Under regularity conditions, both the optimal reserve price and the deposit increase when the distribution of outside offers worsens. (JEL D44, D82) </jats:p>
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association
dc.sourceElements
dc.typeArticle
dc.date.updated2022-12-29T01:50:49Z
dc.contributor.departmentBIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1257/mic.20200206
dc.description.sourcetitleAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
dc.description.volume14
dc.description.issue4
dc.description.page465-493
dc.published.statePublished
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