Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/235690
Title: MAKING MORAL JUDGMENTS: IS THE ROLE OF INTUITION OVERSTATED IN THE SOCIAL INTUITIONIST MODEL?
Authors: FOONG YOKE KAYE
Issue Date: 4-Nov-2022
Citation: FOONG YOKE KAYE (2022-11-04). MAKING MORAL JUDGMENTS: IS THE ROLE OF INTUITION OVERSTATED IN THE SOCIAL INTUITIONIST MODEL?. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: The present research sought to test the robustness of Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) by investigating whether moral dumbfounding—a phenomenon where people stubbornly and steadfastly hold onto their moral judgment despite admitting that they lack valid reasons for it—would occur when participants were presented with a novel set of moral vignettes that depicted agents to have justifiable reasons to engage in their taboo behaviour. By presenting two groups of participants with either the novel vignettes (Justified Version) or Haidt et al.’s vignettes (Unjustified Version), the current study found that participants were (1) more likely to judge the Unjustified Version as morally inappropriate compared to the Justified Version and (2) more likely to morally condemn the Unjustified Version more harshly than the Justified Version. However, (3) participants were equally likely to exhibit moral dumbfounding, regardless of whether they read the Unjustified or Justified Version. In other words, even though the two versions were judged differently, participants were unable to articulate the reasons behind their differential judgments. The findings hence support the SIM, which asserts that we arrive at moral judgments through intuition and not conscious reasoning.
URI: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/235690
Appears in Collections:Bachelor's Theses

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