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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.004
DC FieldValue
dc.titleExclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition
dc.contributor.authorAbito, J.M.
dc.contributor.authorWright, J.
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-03T08:10:00Z
dc.date.available2011-05-03T08:10:00Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationAbito, J.M., Wright, J. (2008). Exclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization 26 (1) : 227-246. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.004
dc.identifier.issn01677187
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/22434
dc.description.abstractThe existing literature on exclusive dealing is extended to take into account that buyers signing exclusive deals are typically competing firms that are differentiated from the perspective of their customers. We show, provided such downstream firms are not too differentiated or provided upstream firms can compete in two-part tariffs, exclusive dealing forecloses entry to a more efficient rival. An established upstream firm and competing downstream firms raise their joint profit by signing exclusive deals to protect the industry from upstream competition. Naked exclusion arises despite the Chicago School logic that buyers only sign contracts that make themselves (jointly) better off. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.004
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectExclusive contracts
dc.subjectForeclosure
dc.subjectNaked exclusion
dc.subjectVertical restraints
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.004
dc.description.sourcetitleInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
dc.description.volume26
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.page227-246
dc.description.codenIJIOD
dc.identifier.isiut000252619800014
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