ON THE CONCEPT OF COMPASSION IN ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

A number of scholars of Rousseau’s political philosophy interpret the theory of the Social Contract dichotomously, depicting its author as a romantic sentimentalist or a proto-Kantian rationalist. The former emphasizes the role of emotions in the Genevan’s politics, specifically the sentiments of pity (or compassion) and self-love; the latter elevates only reason. Rousseau appears to oscillate between the two positions: in some texts, the role of compassion is defended ardently while it is completely absent in others. In this thesis, I argue that this theoretical puzzle can be resolved by piecing together the philosopher’s scattered discussions of pity in a way that demonstrates its practical viability to the Social Contract’s political system. I offer an account of Rousseau’s moral psychology oriented around this socialized pity. A general will arising from a compassionate citizenry will therefore be more likely to incline toward equality, which is a cornerstone of Rousseau’s principles of political right. My thesis thus contributes to the renewed scholarly interest on affective politics and advocates for the revitalization of positive political emotions in contemporary democratic societies.