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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0261-4
DC FieldValue
dc.titleEx ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
dc.contributor.authorSun, Y.
dc.contributor.authorYannelis, N.C.
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-24T06:55:59Z
dc.date.available2011-02-24T06:55:59Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationSun, Y., Yannelis, N.C. (2008). Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility. Economic Theory 36 (1) : 35-55. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0261-4
dc.identifier.issn09382259
dc.identifier.issn14320479
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/20043
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0261-4
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectAsymmetric information
dc.subjectExact law of large numbers
dc.subjectIncentive compatibility
dc.subjectNegligible private information
dc.subjectPareto efficiency
dc.subjectStrong conditional independence
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1007/s00199-007-0261-4
dc.description.sourcetitleEconomic Theory
dc.description.volume36
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.page35-55
dc.identifier.isiut000254772900002
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