Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001
DC FieldValue
dc.titlePure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information
dc.contributor.authorFu, H.
dc.contributor.authorSun, Y.
dc.contributor.authorYannelis, N.C.
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Z.
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-24T06:55:57Z
dc.date.available2011-02-24T06:55:57Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationFu, H., Sun, Y., Yannelis, N.C., Zhang, Z. (2007). Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information. Journal of Mathematical Economics 43 (5) : 523-531. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001
dc.identifier.issn03044068
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/20040
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a new game form which allows the players' strategies to depend on their strategy-relevant private information as well as on some publicly announced information. The players' payoffs depend on their own payoff-relevant private information and some payoff-relevant common information. Under the assumption that the players' strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and their private information is conditionally independent given the public and payoff-relevant common information, we prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for such a game by developing a distribution theory of correspondences via vector measures.©2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001
dc.sourceScopus
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.contributor.departmentMATHEMATICS
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001
dc.description.sourcetitleJournal of Mathematical Economics
dc.description.volume43
dc.description.issue5
dc.description.page523-531
dc.description.codenJMECD
dc.identifier.isiut000247291200001
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