Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information||Authors:||Luo, X.||Keywords:||Common knowledge
|Issue Date:||2009||Citation:||Luo, X. (2009). The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information. Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (12) : 860-868. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.005||Abstract:||This paper studies the decision-theoretic foundation for the notion of stability in the dynamic context of strategic interaction. We formulate and show that common knowledge of rationality implies a "stable" pattern of behavior in extensive games with perfect information. In the "generic" case, our approach is consistent with Aumann's [Aumann, R.J., 1995. Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality. Games and Economic Behavior 8, 6-19] result that common knowledge of rationality leads to the backward induction outcome.©2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.||Source Title:||Journal of Mathematical Economics||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/19984||ISSN:||03044068||DOI:||10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.005|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on May 13, 2020
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.