POLITICAL DEFERENCE IN ASEAN

Abstract

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been hailed as the most successful experiment in regional cooperation in the Third World. Given the conflictual nature of bilateral relations between some of the states in the region, before the formation of ASEAN, this success is indeed quite remarkable. Border problems between Malaysia and the Philippines, Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia and the great diversity in language, culture, political ideology and political systems had given rise to a deep distrust and suspicion in the initial years among the states. The conventional view on the mechanics of cohesion and conflict resolution in ASEAN is that of the twin concepts of consultation and consensus, (Mufakat and Musjawarah). This view is based on the equality of member states who come together to consult on a problem and consequently arrive at a decision based on a consensus. This commonly held view, however, does not completely explain the internal dynamics of ASEAN. This study offers the concept of political deference as an alternative explanation to ASEAN's success. Political deference is based on a unique, interactive and inherently unequal relationship structure and falls within the confines of what would be regarded as the hegemonic stability theory in international relations. The organisation's largest member, Indonesia, by virtue of its size and historical experience, demands deference and the granting of it by the other members, particularly Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, has important implications for the cohesion of ASEAN. This cohesion, however, is qualified by the need for the dominant member to compromise when the need arises, often when the national security of any member is threatened. This ensures both the cohesion of the organisation as well as the perpetuation of the preeminent position of the dominant power. Political deference is examined in this exercise within the framework of two case studies. The first is the ASEAN declaration of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom And Neutrality (Zopfan) in 1971. In this instance Indonesia used its dominance by modifying the original Malaysian proposal. In the second example, ASEAN's policies towards Cambodia were examined. Again this study demonstrates the existence of political deference, although the second case study shows the interactive nature of such deference.